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Policy 
pointers 
n   Schemes that pay 
landowners to protect 
watershed services (PWS 
schemes — Payments 
for Watershed Services) 
are gaining popularity 
as a conservation and 
development tool.
n   PWS schemes need not be 
restricted to protecting 
forests — those aimed at 
promoting soil conservation 
and improved agricultural 
practices are also valuable 
and likely to attract farmers.
n   Private buyers are rarely 
directly involved in PWS 
schemes so policymakers 
need to look to public funds 
to finance these schemes, 
earmarking environmental 
taxes and charges for this 
purpose.
n   The case for PWS needs to 
be made on efficiency 
grounds — investing in 
land management should 
show clear benefits for the 
costs involved. To secure 
their future, PWS schemes 
must provide much better 
evidence of improvements in 
watershed services and local 
livelihoods.
Putting a price on nature
Economic growth and rising populations are fuelling 
ever higher demand for clean water while increasing 
pressures on the ecosystems that help to maintain 
healthy watersheds. One tool that is gaining traction as 
a way to promote watershed conservation and water 
resources management is Payments for Watershed 
Services (PWS). Schemes pay upstream landowners to 
manage their land in ways that promote the regular flow 
of clean water downstream and reduce soil erosion and 
other pollution. 
Payments in these schemes may come from those who 
directly benefit from the improvements, for example 
a water company. More commonly, they come from 
government, donor agencies and nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) on behalf of the beneficiaries or 
society in general. 
The rationale for these payments is that, without 
them, land managers have little incentive to conserve 
watershed services because the benefits — clean, 
regular water supplies — go to others downstream. 
Unless land managers can see or feel the benefits of 
sustainable land management, they may not act in the 
best interests of society at large. 
Payments for watershed services (PWS) are an increasingly popular 
conservation and water management tool in developing countries. Some 
schemes are thriving, and are pro-poor. Others are stalling or have only 
mixed success. Most rely on public or donor finance; and other sources of 
funding are unlikely to play a significant role any time soon. In part, financing 
PWS schemes remains a challenge because the actual evidence for their 
effectiveness is still scanty — it is hard to prove that they actually work to 
benefit both livelihoods and environments. Getting more direct and concrete 
data on costs and benefits will be crucial to securing the long-term future of 
PWS schemes.
Definitions of, and criteria for, Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) schemes — including 
PWS schemes — vary, but what distinguishes them 
from other approaches, such as integrated conservation 
and development projects, is that there is an element of 
‘conditionality’: that is, payment is in some way subject 
to delivery of a quantifiable service, with specific terms 
and conditions often set out in a written agreement with 
the landowner.1,2
PWS schemes can take a number of different forms 
at national, local government and private buyer levels 
(see Table, overleaf). They can operate at large scales, 
covering millions of hectares as in the case of the 
Sloping Lands Conversion Programme, China. Or they 
can be limited to a very small site, as in San Pedro 
del Norte, Nicaragua where, five farmers are paid to 
manage 13 hectares of agricultural land. Some PWS 
schemes focus exclusively on watershed services, while 
others aim to pay for a bundle of ecosystem services, 
combining watershed services with others, such as 
climate regulation, biodiversity or landscape beauty. 
The rise of PWS
PWS schemes are gaining popularity as a tool for 
conservation and water management. Tracking the 
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number of schemes is complicated by differences in how 
schemes are defined but the overall expansion trend 
is clear. IIED’s first review, Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold,4 
identified just 41 proposed 
and ongoing PWS schemes 
in developing countries. 
By 2008, this figure had 
increased to 50 ongoing 
schemes and 45 proposed 
ones.2 Our latest update 
has identified many new 
schemes and proposals 
including national schemes 
in Ecuador and Vietnam and numerous local schemes, 
particularly in Brazil, where in the Atlantic Forest and 
Cerrado alone there are eight schemes up and running, 
with 33 more in the pipeline.3
Latin America has long been the region with the most 
PWS schemes although the past few years have seen 
a proliferation of new schemes and pilots in Africa and 
Asia. Two schemes in Africa — Naivasha-Malewa in 
Kenya and the Uluguru scheme in Tanzania — are 
both facilitated by WWF and CARE and are particularly 
interesting as they have succeeded in securing 
contributions from the private sector: from commercial 
farmers in the Lake Naivasha water resource users 
association and from Coca Cola in Tanzania. 
But other schemes have been less successful; 
EcoServicios in El Salvador never fulfilled the 
expectations of growing from a local pilot into a national 
scheme.2 Many other schemes have yet to make it 
past the pilot stage to scaling up and replication in 
other areas. In part this is because of the significant 
institutional and funding challenges they face if 
facilitating organisations do not sustain their input. 
Does PWS work for the poor?
The extent to which the poorest groups participate in, 
and benefit from, PWS schemes varies.1,2 In Mexico, 
a national PWS scheme includes a high proportion 
of forest land that is held as common property by 
indigenous and farming communities, and here, a 
substantial share of the payments — as much as 84 
per cent in 2004 — has gone to marginalised groups.5 
But in Costa Rica, in spite of efforts to prioritise poorer 
regions, research shows that small farmers are not well 
represented in the national PES scheme, although this 
might change in the future with the introduction of a 
new priority criteria for small farms.6 And in China, there 
has been considerable regional variation in benefits. 
Without secure land tenure it can be hard for small-
scale farmers and rural communities to participate in 
national and local PWS schemes. But high transaction 
costs also pose an obstacle to participation: the costs 
for participants — which can involve mapping land 
boundaries, doing a forest management plan, and 
providing documents to prove eligibility and later 
demonstrate compliance — do not vary much with 
increasing size of landholding so they tend to hit small-
scale farmers more. 
Similarly for administrators of the scheme it is more 
expensive and more difficult to achieve the necessary 
threshold levels to ensure environmental effectiveness 
when dealing with many farmers that have very small 
landholdings compared with dealing with fewer, larger 
landowners. Lack of capacity among small-scale farmers 
to take on new activities such as reforestation can also 
lead to lower than expected benefits — in terms of 
timber harvests when trees reach maturity — for those 
participating.
Yet proponents of small, local schemes have generally 
achieved a good level of participation from smallholders 
and poor communities. This is partly because they 
have been able to adapt to local circumstances, taking 
time to build up trust among the landowners and find 
ways around obstacles such as lack of clear land titles. 
This is the case for the Los Negros scheme in Bolivia, 
where NGO Fundación Natura facilitated discussions 
between upstream and downstream landowners, and 
then introduced a payment scheme initially with donor 
funding. Where there were no formal land titles, the 
NGO used local recognition of landholdings.12 
Concrete data on costs and 
benefits will be crucial to 
securing the long-term future 
of PWS schemes 
Table. Models of payments for watershed services 
Type of PWS Example
National scheme In Mexico the National Forest Commission (CONAFOR) pays landowners to 
conserve forests using funds earmarked from a water charge.2
Local government buyer In Extrema municipality, Minas Gerais, Brazil the local government pays farmers to 
adopt good agricultural practices and forest restoration to reduce soil erosion.3
Local private buyer In Mt Kanla-On, Philippines a private water-using company finances resource 
management projects with landowners.2
Trust fund In Ecuador, a trust fund called Fonag draws in contributions from a number of water 
users, both public and private, to finance a range of land-based interventions in the 
watershed.2
Other PWS programmes — generally donor-funded 
— have deliberately targeted poor and marginalised 
groups to develop pro-poor approaches and show how 
environmental services payment schemes can both 
reduce poverty and achieve environmental goals. One 
example is the Rewarding the Upland Poor in Asia 
for Environmental Services They Provide (RUPES) 
programme, which has initiated or facilitated a number 
of payment schemes in Asia, many with a focus on 
watersheds. In Sumberjaya, Indonesia, RUPES helped 
people take advantage of a government programme that 
granted land tenure to farmers on condition of agreed 
land management. The land management helps protect 
watersheds, while the land tenure has increased average 
household income by 30 per cent.13
But whether schemes that set out to be pro-poor 
can move beyond demonstration projects to secure 
permanent sources of funding or to scale up to other 
areas remains to be seen.
Effectiveness evidence
Despite the growing number of PWS schemes, the 
evidence of their environmental effectiveness is quite 
scanty and even contested. Assessing schemes is 
difficult. 
First, assessments need to show whether the payments 
lead landowners to change land use and land 
management practices, or whether they simply pay 
them to do what they would have done anyway. This 
requires comparing them with landowners who are not 
in the PWS scheme but are similar in other respects. 
Identifying such a group can be challenging, and 
conducting the research costly. What research there has 
been has not always found a benefit. For example, a 
2007 study in Costa Rica revealed very little difference 
between deforestation rates within and outside PWS 
schemes during the first part of the programme.14 
However, effectiveness was found to increase later in the 
programme with better targeting.15 
Next, the changes in land use and management 
upstream must be linked to downstream improvements 
in water quantity, quality and regularity of flow. And 
these hydrological changes, in turn, must be shown to 
translate into benefits for human populations. Such data 
is rarely collected: very few PWS schemes go beyond 
monitoring compliance with agreed land management 
practices to actually measuring trends in water 
indicators.
For many years it was assumed that forests were the 
best land cover for maximising water yield, regulating 
seasonal flows and ensuring high water quality. But 
forest hydrological research over the past 20 years has 
shown that the links are more complex.16 Measuring 
forest cover trends as a proxy for watershed services, as 
done in some PWS schemes, is likely to be incomplete 
or even misleading. Much depends on location-specific 
characteristics such as slope, soil quality and climate, 
and this means that targeting is very important. There 
can also be tradeoffs across the range of watershed 
services. For example, increasing forest cover can 
reduce water yield in some circumstances but improve 
water quality. The Sloping Lands Conversion Programme 
in China illustrates some of the challenges in achieving 
effective delivery of watershed services through PWS 
(see Mixed messages from China).
For these reasons, proof that PWS schemes are cost 
effective remains elusive. Predictive studies may 
estimate that investing in land management to reduce 
erosion is cheaper than installing new water treatment 
capacity, but getting from these hypothetical estimates 
to evidence on the ground is hard. The transaction costs 
involved in setting up and running PWS schemes — 
from design to consultation with landowners to contract 
negotiation to monitoring compliance — also need to be 
taken into account. 
Prospects for PWS 
The growing momentum behind schemes for reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+) and other land-based carbon mitigation 
options raises the prospect of considerable funds for 
forest carbon from developed country governments and 
private sector. It will be important to exploit synergies 
between the climate regulation services of forests and 
watershed services. Certainly, some of the earliest 
payments for environmental services schemes, for 
example those in Costa Rica and Mexico, pursued 
PES and PWS as a way to promote improved forest 
management and conservation. Watershed services 
were one of a bundle of forest ecosystem services that 
could provide strong justification and finance for forest 
conservation. Some new schemes in Ecuador and 
Vietnam are pursuing the same model. 
Mixed messages from China
The Sloping Land Conversion Programme (SLCP) in China — which pays landowners to 
plant trees on farmed or degraded land — was introduced to help reduce flooding, but it has 
had mixed evaluations.  
A big concern is that although the objective was to target degraded land with a steep slope, 
in practice, some of the tree planting has taken place on fertile flat land. One survey7 found 
that 21 per cent of sampled land had a slope of less than 15 degrees. 
Other concerns are low survival rates of the planted trees, and lack of technical support,8  as 
well as the scheme’s limited suitability for drier regions of China, where afforestation would 
reduce water yield.9 
Social impacts have been mixed too. In Zhoushi County, the scheme has boosted household 
incomes.10 But in other provinces, payments for many participants covered only a part of the 
costs they incurred by converting their agricultural land to planted forests.11,7
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But in many of the newer PWS schemes the emphasis 
is on broader sustainable land management, with 
incentives provided not just for maintaining or restoring 
forests near rivers but also soil conservation practices. 
In the Naivasha-Malewa scheme in Kenya, farmers are 
being paid to plant grass strips, build terraces, reduce 
their use of agrochemicals, plant high-yielding fruit 
trees and grow cover crops such as potatoes, as well as 
rehabilitate and maintain riparian zones.17 And in Brazil, 
the Produtor de Água (water producer) programme 
of the National Water Agency promotes a wide range 
of sustainable agricultural practices to reduce soil 
erosion.18 These activities are attractive not only for 
their off-farm impacts but for their potential to increase 
farmers’ incomes.Yet securing funds to scale up PWS 
remains a major challenge in all regions. Although there 
have been some successes in attracting funding from 
private water users, the overwhelming impression is that 
PWS schemes rely on public funds and that reliance is 
likely to continue. 
This need not be a weakness, provided public agencies 
have a secure source of finance for the schemes. The 
Costa Rica model of earmarking fuel and water tax 
revenues for the national PES scheme is an example 
where this was successful. 
But to make the case for funding, whether from private 
sources or earmarked tax revenue, better evidence is 
needed that PWS schemes can deliver improvements 
in watershed services while improving livelihoods of 
the upstream communities. Establishing this will be 
fundamental to securing the future of PWS schemes 
around the world.
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